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Abstract: 
This paper looks at five different ways in which the effect of fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand in the short term can be empirically estimated, and asks 
two questions: First, given the assumption that fiscal policy has the same 
effect across countries, which of the five indicators is the empirically best 
measure of fiscal impact on demand? Second, is it reasonable to interpret 
fiscal policy indicators similarly across countries, or does the effect of fiscal 
policy on demand differ to a degree that makes this unreasonable? Running a 
panel regression of changes in aggregate demand on the five measures of 
fiscal policy in turn for OECD countries, the conclusion is that OECD's 
structural budget balance measure seems to be the more plausible measure of 
fiscal impact on demand. Moreover, testing the restriction that the five 
measures have identical parameters across OECD countries is rejected in five 
all cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The effect of fiscal policy on demand is very complex and not easily measurable. In many 
situations, however, it may nevertheless be important to have a notion of how fiscal policy is 
affecting demand in the short term. Several fiscal indicators are used interchangeably for this 
purpose. Moreover, these measures are often given the same interpretation across countries, 
in that way disregarding that the effect of fiscal policy on demand may depend on the country 
in question.  
 
The aim of the paper is two-fold. First, given the assumption that fiscal policy has the same 
effect across countries, which of a set of often used indicators is the empirically best measure 
of fiscal impact on demand? Second, is it reasonable to interpret fiscal policy indicators 
similarly across countries, or does the effect of fiscal policy on demand differ to a degree that 
makes this unreasonable? 
 
Section II outlines five indicators commonly used as measures of fiscal impact on demand. 
The empirical literature on fiscal multipliers, presented in Section III, often uses structural 
budget balances as measures of fiscal policy in short term growth regressions for individual 
countries. There are no studies using cross-country data to identify a common impact of 
fiscal policy on demand, and more importantly, there are no studies which directly compare 
different indicators of the impact of fiscal policy on demand. Section IV provides such a 
comparison of five different indicators of fiscal policy for a panel of 20 OECD countries, and 
subsequently puts the hypothesis that the fiscal multipliers are the same across countries to a 
test. The results of the analysis show that, given the assumption that the demand effect of 
fiscal policy is similar across countries, the OECD measure of the change in the structural 
budget balance seems to be preferable to the four other measures as general indicators of 
fiscal impact on demand. However, when testing the hypothesis of cross-country similarity of 
fiscal impact on demand, this hypothesis is rejected. Regressions for individual countries 
show that the size, sign and timing of fiscal multipliers differ substantially across the panel of   - 4 - 
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OECD countries, implying that a similar interpretation of fiscal impact indicators across 
countries is empirically unwarranted. Section V concludes. 
 
INDICATORS OF FISCAL IMPACT ON DEMAND 
 
This paper sets out to compare the five fiscal policy indicators listed below. 
 
1.  The change in the total budget balance (TBB) 
2.  The change in the IMF calculated structural balance (SBBIMF) 
3.  The change in the OECD calculated structural balance (SBBOECD)
2  
4.  The change in the EU calculated structural balance (SBBEU) 
5.  The Fiscal Impulse (FI)) 
 
Using these summary measures as indicators of fiscal impact on demand have been criticized 
from many angles
3. One such criticism is that as measures of the impact of fiscal policy on 
demand, none of the indicators listed above can be derived from a theoretical model. They 
are as such ad hoc measures. Moreover, using the total budget balance (TBB) as a measure of 
fiscal impact, the problem arises that part of the total budget is determined by the cycle, due 
                                                 
2 The OECD’s measure of the SBB is also referred to as the CAB (the Cyclically Adjusted Balance). 
3 First and most prominently, the single indicator approach is discredited when using the simple IS model, 
which implies that the revenue and the expenditure sides of the budget have different multiplier effects and 
hence should not be treated as equal. More sophisticated models imply that also expectations and foresight 
assumptions are important and should be incorporated, not to mention the tax structure, composition of 
spending, and level of public debt
 (for a theoretical treatment of fiscal impact on demand, see Chouraqui (1990) 
or Blanchard (1990)), all of which are ignored by the change in the deficit approach. Furthermore, fiscal 
indicators do not take into account that the impact of fiscal policy on demand depends on the economic 
environment in which fiscal policy operates. The reaction of monetary policy to fiscal changes, which exchange 
rate regime prevails, whether there is excess capacity in the economy etc. all affect how fiscal policy affects 
demand, but these issues are abstracted from when using a single indicator. Another problem with the use of 
indicators is that there is no “correct way” of measuring the government budget, implying that any measure of 
fiscal impact becomes dependent on what accounting method is used. In addition, the fiscal and national 
accounting data used to form the fiscal indicators may be subject to revisions over time, implying that the 
recently published fiscal indicators may be uncertain and subject to revisions over time (the version of the 
indicators used in the empirical analysis below are not subject to this uncertainty since they are based on 
historical data.). These and other reasons have often been raised against using summary measures of fiscal 
impact on demand. There are, however, no easily implementable alternatives.   - 5 - 
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to automatic stabilizers. Hence, if it is the case that the budget has an effect on the cycle, and 
thus on demand, it is not straightforward to separate out what part of the change in demand 
has affected the budget and what part has been determined by the budget. Using the structural 
budget balance (SBB) as an indicator of fiscal impact in theory eliminates this problem of 
endogeneity, since the structural budget balance is an indicator of the budget that would 
prevail were the economy at full, or trend, employment
4. A change in the SBB is hence an 
indicator of non-cyclical change in fiscal policy. If correctly computed, the SBB should 
therefore be orthogonal to the cycle. There are several sources of uncertainty in the 
derivation of the three structural budget balances, however, which may result in the cyclical 
component not being completely removed, or alternatively, over-removed, such that the 
calculated SBB turns out still to be correlated with the cycle. The Fiscal Impulse
5 (FI) is also 
a measure which corrects for the effect of the cycle, although in a slightly simpler, but hence 
less uncertain, way. The same risk of over or under-correction for the effect of the cycle 
persist, however. Appendix lays out the exact formulas for the Fiscal Impulse (FI) and the 
three structural budget balance indicators calculated by the IMF (SBBIMF), the European 
Commission Services (SBBEU) and the OECD (SBBOECD). The procedures used for 
calculating the three SBBs differ only in detail
6. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Several studies use fiscal indicators as measures of fiscal policy when estimating the size of 
fiscal multipliers in short run regressions of demand, and usually find that selected fiscal 
indicators significantly explain part of the variation in aggregate demand. The main results of 
the empirical literature are summarized in Table 1. 
                                                 
4 See Banca d’Italia (1999) for a thorough overview of the Structural Budget Balance measure. 
5 See Heller et al. (1986) for an introduction to the Fiscal Impulse measure. 
6 The SBBOECD is usually reported as a primary balance measure while the SBBIMF and the SBBEU are reported 
as actual balance measures. Appendix lays out the formula for the primary SBBOECD, but the measure used in 
the empirical analysis is the actual SBBOECD.   - 6 - 
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As far as short term multiplier effects of fiscal policy are concerned, the bulk of the analysis 
has been carried out for US data, and thus tends to use the US Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) measure of the US structural budget balance, called the standardized- or high-
employment surplus, as a measure of fiscal policy. Eisner (1989) estimates a simple 
regression of real GNP growth on a constant and the lag of the level of the high-employment 
surplus in percent of GNP. He finds that a one percentage point drop in the high-employment 
surplus results in a 1.7 to 2.5 percentage points increase in growth the year after. Other 
studies of US data have included additional explanatory variables in the regression, which 
have resulted in more moderate estimates of the fiscal multiplier. As an example, Perry and 
Schultze (1993), using quarterly data from 1956 to 1992, regress the change in the log of 
GDP on lags of the dependent variable, current and several lags of the change in the high-
employment surplus share of GDP and the change in the federal funds rate, and find that a 
one percentage point fall in the high-employment surplus increases growth by 0.66 
percentage points.  
 
The multipliers estimated in the Eisner (1989) and the Perry and Schultze (1993) may be 
even larger than what the results of their estimations suggest, due to a potential negative bias 
stemming from the endogeneity of fiscal policy to the cycle. If the structural budget surplus 
is not perfectly rinsed of cyclical effects, some of the correlation between the structural 
budget balance and demand may be due to a residual effect of automatic stabilizers. Two 
overall methods have been employed in the recent literature to control for this simultaneity 
bias: Instrumental Variables estimation (IV) and VAR modeling, both with shortcomings
7. 
Romer and Romer (1994), in a regression similar to that of Perry ands Schultze, using 
quarterly data from 1957 to 1988 find that a one percentage point drop in the high-
                                                 
7 It is a challenge to find good exogenous instruments for fiscal policy. Thus, when using the IV estimator, a 
substantial amount of information is usually lost. Employing the VAR approach requires imposing restrictions 
for identification. Finding the right restrictions is not obvious and may end up being somewhat arbitrary. 
Moreover, VAR cannot be used for cross country analyses, and literature on how to apply VAR to panel data is 
only barely being written.   - 7 - 
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employment surplus to GDP ratio leads to a 1.1 percentage point increase in growth over 
about ten quarters from when the increase took place. Recently, studies of fiscal multipliers 
using VAR modeling have addressed some of the shortcomings of the simple regression 
analysis approach, such as the potential endogeneity of policy to the business cycle 
mentioned above, in addition to improving on the dynamic specification of the models. Most 
VAR studies, however, use the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget separately (see 
for example Bayoumi (1999) and/or Blanchard and Perotti (1999) in Table 1). An exception 
is Bruneau and de Bandt (1999), who use the level of the primary budget deficit in addition 
to the change in the log of output, the short term interest rates and other variables in two 
VAR models (one on French data and one on German data). They find a positive fiscal 
multiplier for Germany, which is significant for three quarters after the shock to the budget 
balance. Shocks to the primary budget deficit are found to have no statistically significant 
effect on output in France.  
 
In conclusion, the literature shows that measures of the change in the structural budget 
balance have significant explanatory power in regressions on US data, while the primary 
budget balance has explanatory power for German data, but not for France. There are no 
cross-country studies of short-term fiscal impact on demand or output. The literature hence 
does not indicate whether any fiscal policy indicator can explain variation in demand in a 
consistent fashion across countries. There are also no comparisons of different measures of 
fiscal impact allowing us to compare the power of such measures to other measures in 
explaining the variation in demand. The next section sets out to estimate at panel data 
regression for short term fiscal impact on demand in OECD countries, with the aim of 
providing an empirical comparison of the five indicators of the impact of fiscal policy on 
demand discussed in Section II, and testing whether this impact effect can reasonably be 
considered similar in timing and magnitude across OECD countries. 
 
Table 1.  A Summary of The Empirical Literature on Fiscal Multipliers 
Study Dependen
t Variable 
Fiscal Indicator  Estimation 
Method and 
Sample 
Results   - 8 - 







First lag of the annual real high 
employment surplus
a 
OLS – US 
data 
A percentage point drop in the High-
employment surplus results in a 1.7 to 2.5 
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France: There is no statistically significant 
impact of the budget balance on output. 
Germany: There is a significantly negative 
impact on growth from shocks to the primary 






log of real 
GDP 
Log of real government spending 
excl. transfers and log of real 
government revenue excl. 
transfers, both in shares of GDP 
VAR. US 
data. 
an increase in spending will result in a 
multiplier of GDP by between 0.9 and 1.3 at the 
peak (which occurred between the first and the 
15
th quarter, depending on the specification), 
after which it declines. An increase in taxes will 
result in a GDP multiplier of -0.8 to -1.3 at the 
peak (after 5 to 7 quarters), after which it 
declines. 
a) The US congressional budget office measure of the US structural budget balance, referred to in their statistics 
as the high-employment or standardized-employment surplus. 
b) The IMF structural budget balance formula was used. 
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The following empirical analysis aims at answering two questions. First, given the 
assumption that the effect of fiscal policy on demand is similar across countries, which fiscal 
indicator(s) is(are) the best and which indicator(s) should not be used as measures of fiscal 
impact on demand. The second question is whether the assumption that fiscal impact on 
demand is similar across countries is a reasonable one. To answer the first question, a time 
series cross country equation for demand changes is estimated for 20 OECD countries and 
the explanatory power and robustness of each fiscal indicator is tested. The second question 
is answered by testing the pooled specification of the regression equation against the 
unconstrained alternative, in which parameter estimates are allowed to vary across countries.  
Before outlining a methodology, it is important to stress that this paper does not estimate an 
equation derived from a structural model. Assuming an overall keynesian framework, where 
changes in fiscal policy affect changes in demand, it simply sets out to estimate partial 
correlations between fiscal indicators and changes in demand in order to evaluate and 
compare their explanatory power. 
 
A.   Methodology 
 
Assume that demand is affected by changes in fiscal policy and that the indicator of change 
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where Yi,t is real demand in country i in year t, FPi,t is one of the five fiscal policy indicators 
and Xi,t is a vector of other variables determining demand. Assume also that the effect of 
fiscal policy on demand is stable across OECD countries and time, such that the relationship 
can be estimated for a panel of OECD countries.   -  10  - 
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Real demand is measured by real GDP. All indicators of fiscal impact on demand are 
measured such that a positive change in the measure implies a higher deficit as a percent of 
GDP and hence an expansionary fiscal policy
8. In order to allow for lags in the 
implementation and effect of fiscal policy, the first lag of the fiscal policy variable is 
included in the regression. As an indicator of monetary policy, the central bank discount rate 
prevailing at the beginning of the period is included
9. The one year lag of average real oil 
price proxies for external supply shocks
10. 
We thus estimate the equation: 
 
















1 , µ λ β β β β α + + + + ∆ ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + = −
−
−   
 
where λ i is included to allow a component of the error term to be country specific and time 
invariant and non-stochastic. The regression is estimated correcting for cross sectional 
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation
11. First-order autocorrelation is tested for 
using the DW test for panel data
12. 
 
The analysis is carried out for annual data for a panel of 20 OECD countries for the time 
period 1972 to 1999. Data comes from IMF’s World Economic Outlook database, 
International Financial Statistics and the OECD Economic Outlook database. Since all data 
                                                 
8 The real budget deficit in percent of real GDP is proxied by the nominal budget deficit measure divided by 
nominal GDP due to lack of a price deflator for budget items. 
9 It makes no difference for the parameter estimates whether the level or the change in the interest rate is 
included. 
10 Including the current value results in an insignificant parameter estimate and does not otherwise change the 
results. 
11 FGLS is used as estimation procedure. The coefficients of contemporaneous correlation and cross sectional 
heteroskedasticity used in the transformation of the data are iterated to convergence 
12 See Baltagi (1995), p 94 or Bhargava et al. (1982).   -  11  - 
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are not available for the entire period for some countries and some series, an unbalanced 
panel sample is used, i.e. the time period is allowed to vary across countries according to data 
availability. This amounts to a sample period of an average of 15 years per country, spread 
out on the 28 years of the entire sample period. The three structural budget balances and the 
fiscal stance are calculated using the formulas provided in Appendix. To avoid problems of 
comparability and to simplify the computations, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
Database (WEO) measure of potential output and the Giorno et al. (1995) elasticities
13 have 
been applied to all structural budget balance indicators. The choice of trend or potential 
output should not make a substantial difference since we are concerned with changes, and not 
levels, of the measures. All other data used for the indicator calculations are taken from 
WEO except budget item weights, which are from the OECD Economic Outlook database. 
The SBBOECD is calculated gross of interest payments on the public debt, in spite of it being 
published as a primary balance measure, in order to ensure that the results be comparable for 
the three structural budget balances
14. Table A and B in Appendix summarize the main 
empirical properties of the levels and first differences of the indicators in percent of GDP for 
the largest common sample (1988-1999).  
 
Using simple FGLS does not take into account the problem that some of the fiscal policy 
measures may be endogenous to the cycle. Not correcting for this endogeneity may bias the 
parameter estimates negatively, since higher growth leads to lower budget deficits, all else 
equal. If this is the case for the structural budget balance measures, it would be a reason for 
not using the SBB “raw” as fiscal indicators, i.e. without taking into account the cycle. In 
order to compare the results of the basic regressions with regression results corrected for the 
endogeneity, each equation is also estimated using instrumental variables for the current 
                                                 
13 More recent estimates of output elasticities of the budget have been provided in van den Noord (2000), but 
since the calculations go back to 1972, we found it more appropriate to use elasticities based on data going 
further back.  
14 It turns out not to be important for the conclusions whether the primary measure or the actual measure of the 
SBBOECD is used.  -  12  - 
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fiscal policy measure
15. It is important to stress, however, that the relevant parameter 
estimates remain the actual and not the IV results since policymakers use the actual budget 
balance and not an instrumentalized budget balance as indicator. Finding exogenous 
instruments likely to capture annual fluctuations in fiscal variables is not an easy task. As 
instruments are used the change in the fiscal variable itself
16, the beginning of period and 
lagged discount rate, the current and lagged real oil price, and a linear time trend. The 
instruments are not very successful in explaining the fiscal variables which is another reason 
for not attaching much importance to the instrumental variable (IV) regression results. 
 
Whether the fiscal variable has the right sign (i.e. a positive parameter estimate) and is 
significant is a first criterion by which to evaluate and rank the tested indicators. Second, the 
robustness of the parameter estimates is investigated. This is done by testing whether the 
results change when the sample period is changed or when other variables are included in the 
regressions
17,18. Finally, whether the pooled specification is statistically significant, i.e. 
whether fiscal multipliers can be accepted as being similar across countries is tested. 
                                                 
15 The first stage regressions used to estimate the fitted values of the explanatory variables are carried out 
unconstrained, such that the coefficients of the instruments are allowed to vary across countries. 
16 i.e. the change in the change in the budget deficit measure. It would provide more explanatory power to use 
the lag of the fiscal variable itself and not the change in this as an instrument. Regrettably, using predetermined 
endogenous variables may introduce a bias in the presence of fixed effects, since these variables are correlated 
with the fixed component of the error term. Taking the change in the fiscal variable eliminates this problem 
since the fixed effect is differenced away. However, due to this bias correction, the instruments explain a 
relatively small fraction of the total variation in the fiscal variable, rendering the instrumental variable 
regressions less reliable. 
17 As other variables that might effect the relationship are included the effective exchange rate, which is another 
monetary policy target which can be controlled for, and the export to GDP ratio, which is often controlled for in 
the empirical growth literature over the longer term. 
18 The R
2 of the regressions are not compared directly since this is meaningless when FGLS is used as 
estimation procedure. See Greene (1997), pages 508-509.  -  13  - 
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B.   Empirical Results 
 
The results of the regressions are given in Table C and D in Appendix. All variables are in 
percentages, except for the lagged oil price, which is an index. The parameter estimate of the 
current and lagged fiscal variable can thus be interpreted as the predicted percentage point 
change in growth from a one percentage point increase in the respective deficit to GDP 
ratio
19. The parameter estimates of the fiscal variables of the six basic regressions are 
presented in Table 2 below. Column 1 gives the results of the basic regression using the 
actual variables. Column 2 gives the results current and lagged fiscal variable using IV for 
the current fiscal variable and column three gives the results when only the lag of the fiscal 
variable is included in the regression. F-tests of all parameter estimates of the explanatory 
variables being equal to zero are rejected for all basic regressions. The within–group DW test 
statistics for first order autocorrelation are given in Table E in Appendix for the six basic 
regressions. There is a tendency toward positive autocorrelation
20, implying a specification 
problem, but since the focus is on the partial correlation between demand and fiscal policy 
indicators, this potential problem is disregarded. 
                                                 
19 Moreover, the parameter estimate of the interest rate can be interpreted as the predicted percentage point 
change of a one percentage point increase in the interest rate. 
20 The 5% critical values the DW for panel data given in Bhargave et al (1982) imply that positive 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected for SBBIMF, SBBEU, SBBOECD and FI, although it is on the border of being 
rejected for TBB on a five percent significant level.  -  14  - 
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Table 2.  Parameter estimates of fiscal indicators from the regression of real growth rates on 









IV Current  IV Lagged  Lag only 
)TBB  -1.77
* -0.04 -1.88
* -0.04 -0.14 
)SBBIMF  -0.00 0.12 1.32
* -0.15 0.12 
)SBBOECD  0.28
* 0.22 0.38
* 0.11 0.17 
)SBBEU  -0.34
* 0.08 -0.74
* 0.10  0.10 
FI  -0.05 0.09 1.53
* 0.13 0.10 
*) Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 
Basic empirical results 
First, it is important to notice that the lagged fiscal variables are insignificantly different from 
zero for all fiscal measures. Hence, only the contemporaneous parameter estimates will hence 
be discussed in the following. The parameter estimate for total budget balance is significant 
but has the wrong sign, which is not unexpected: the total budget balance is obviously 
endogenous to the cycle. Using instrumental variables should control for this endogeneity by 
decreasing the size of the negative parameter estimates, and the fact that this does not take 
place could be due to the poor quality of the instruments. The data thus suggests that 
empirically the total budget balances does not provide a good indicator of fiscal impact on 
demand. The OECD structural budget balance measure has the expected significant 
contemporaneous effect on demand. The parameter estimate of the IMF measure is 
insignificant while that of the EU measures is significantly negative. Instrumenting the 
current value of the change in the three SBB results in the parameter estimate of the SBBIMF 
turning positive, significant and greater than one, while the parameter estimate of the SBBEU 
becomes even more negative. The parameter estimate of the instrumentalized SBBOECD 
becomes slightly higher and stays significant. The results for the FI measure are relatively 
similar to those of the SBBIMF. These observations point to the SBBOECD as the relatively 
more reliable measure of demand impact of fiscal policy across countries, but before a final 
conclusion can be drawn, the robustness of the measures has to be evaluated. 
  -  15  - 
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Table 3. Current parameter estimates of fiscal indicators. Robustness across time and 





















* -0.22 -0.23 
FI  -0.48 -0.02 1.12 
*) Significant at a 5% significance level. 
 
Robustness 
To evaluate the robustness of the parameter estimates of the five fiscal variables in 
explaining short term growth rates, the basic regression was estimates excluding observations 
from the 1990s, then excluding observations from the 1970s and finally including other 
explanatory variables in the regression. A full account of the results is giving in table D in 
Appendix. A summary is provided in Table 3 above. The results show that the parameter 
estimates of the SBBOECD and the TBB are fairly robust across time and with other variables 
included in the regression. The parameter estimates of the SBBIMF, SBBEU and the FI change 
signs and are only significant when the sub-sample excluding the 1990s is used. A little 
curiosity worth noting is that the lagged SBBOECD and SBBEU turn significant when 
observations from the 1990s are excluded, which is also the case for the lagged SBBOECD 
when other variables are included in the regression. 
 
Conclusions of the panel data regression 
To conclude on the panel data regression analysis, the contemporaneous change in the 
structural budget balance as calculated using the OECD method mounts from the empirical 
analysis as the best general cross country measure of demand impact of fiscal policy. A one 
percentage point change in the SBBOECD is predicted to result in between 0.28 and 0.56 
percentage point increase in growth in the same year. There does not seem to be lagged  -  16  - 
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effects of fiscal policy as measured by the SBBOECD
21. The total budget balance is not useful 
as an indicator of fiscal impact on demand, largely due to endogeneity. The structural budget 
balances calculated using the EU is significantly negatively explaining the variation in 
demand, which is opposite to the expected effect of fiscal policy. Moreover, the parameter 
estimate does not stay significant and positive across time and when other variables are 
included. The structural budget balance calculated using IMF’s methodology and the fiscal 
impulse measures both prove to be insignificant in explaining the variation in demand. The 
parameter estimates are furthermore unstable across time and when other explanatory 
variables are included in the regression. 
An interesting result which is worth mentioning, although it is not of importance in the 
present context, is that the most robustly estimated parameter is that of the central bank 
interest rate, which is and between –0.46 and -1.13 and significant in all regressions. The 
beginning of period discount rate set by the central bank clearly affects short term growth 
negatively. 
  
Should the effect of fiscal policy on demand be treated as similar across OECD countries? 
The F and Chi-square statistics for the hypothesis that all four explanatory variables of the 
basic regression equation have the same parameter estimates are laid out in Table F in 
Appendix. The hypothesis is rejected for all five fiscal policy indicators
22. The effect of fiscal 
policy on demand cannot be empirically accepted as similar across OECD countries. Table G 
of Appendix lays out the parameter estimates of the fiscal variables of the individual country 
regressions. The contemporaneous change in the total budget is consistently negatively 
correlated with the real growth rate. The signs and significance of the fiscal impulse and the 
change in the three structural budget balances range from negative to positive and from 
                                                 
21 Disregarding the parameter estimate of the lagged SBBOECD when observations from the 
1990s are excluded from the sample.  
22 The unrestricted models are estimated as a system, correcting for contemporaneous correlation. The 
hypothesis that all parameter estimates are equal across countries is tested. When, alternatively, the hypothesis 
that only the parameter estimates of the two fiscal variables are the same across countries is tested, this 
hypothesis is equally rejected.  -  17  - 
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significant to insignificant, depending on the country in question, but the results are relatively 
similar across fiscal measures. For example, the contemporaneous and lagged partial 
correlation of all fiscal policy indicators except the TBB are significantly positive for 
Germany, while the SBBIMF, SBBEU and the FI have significant negative parameter estimates 
for Finland. In contrast, all three structural balances and the fiscal impulse are insignificant 
for Japan. These results may be taken to imply that the structural balances and the fiscal 
impulse have different degrees of endogeneity across countries, and hence that the parameter 
estimates are biased to the degree which depends on the country. Alternatively, and more 
realistically, the results imply that the impact of fiscal policy on demand differ substantially 
across countries. Irrespective of the interpretation given to the results, the conclusion 
necessarily is that more than choosing the best general indicator of demand impact of fiscal 
policy, it is important to look at how fiscal policy affects demand in the country under 
investigation, and in turn how this might or might not be captured by the fiscal indicators 




Five fiscal measures, the change in the total budget balance, the change in three measures of 
the structural budget balance and the fiscal impulse, are all commonly used as indicators of 
fiscal impact on demand. These fiscal indicators are usually applied in the same manor across 
countries, disregarding that fiscal policy is likely to affect demand differently in different 
countries. With that observation in mind, this paper has attempted to answer two questions. 
First, assuming that the effect of fiscal policy is in fact similar across OECD countries, which 
fiscal indicator(s) best capture(s) the demand effect of fiscal policy and should be preferred 
for policy analysis, and which indicator(s) should not be considered for this job? A pooled 
cross country time series regression of data for 20 OECD countries showed that the 
contemporaneous measure of the structural budget balance calculated by the OECD (the 
SBBOECD) clearly does the best job out of the five tested indicators in explaining short term 
changes in demand. A one percentage point increase in the SBBOECD when defined as a 
deficit was estimated to increase short term growth by between 0.28 and 0.56 percentage 
points. The total budget deficit proved to be unfit as an indicator of fiscal impact on demand  -  18  - 
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since it was shown to be negatively correlated with growth, most likely due to the cyclical 
effect of growth on the budget deficit. The parameter estimates of the structural budget 
balances calculated using the IMF and the EU methods and the fiscal impulse measure either 
had wrong signs and/or proved to be unstable over time or sensitive to the variables included 
in the regression.  
The second question that this paper attempted to answer was whether the demand effect of 
fiscal policy reasonably can be viewed as similar across OECD countries in the first place. If 
not, the panel data regression only captures significant average effects which may be driven 
by a small subset of countries in the panel, without bringing information about how fiscal 
policy affects demand in individual countries. When testing whether the unconstrained 
country estimates of the regression could be accepted as equal, this was rejected for all five 
measures of fiscal policy included in this study. Individual country regressions show that 
depending on the country, the empirical effect of fiscal policy ranges from significantly 
positive to significantly negative, while in some countries being insignificant. The results 
indicate that fiscal policy indicators should be chosen and interpreted in the light of which 
country is being investigated. More country specific analyses of fiscal impact on demand 
would be helpful in determining more exactly how this should be done.  -  19  - 
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Appendix 
 
Formulas for constructing the Fiscal Indicators used in the panel data regression 
analysis. 
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See European Commission (1995), Braconier and Holden (1999) and Hernández de Cos 
(1998) 
 



















































See Hagemann (1998), WEO, October 1993. Annex 1: “Structural Budget Indicators for the 
Major Industrial Countries”, and Braconier and Holden (1999) 
 





















































































See Van den Noord (2000), Suyker (1998) and OECD (2000). GI should be subtracted to 
arrive at the actual (i.e. not primary) balance measure. -  20  - 
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IMF’s Cyclically Neutral Budget Balance (CNB), Fiscal Stance (FS) and Fiscal Impulse (FI) 
 
Cyclically Neutral Balance: 
p
t t IMF Y g Y t CNB
t s ⋅ − ⋅ = 0 0 ,  
 
Fiscal Stance: 



































For more information on the cyclically neutral balance and fiscal stance, see Heller et al 




Definitions of variables used: 
 









ε ε γ ε
,  
c Rlag ε γ ε ⋅ − = ) 1 (  is the elasticity of current revenue to lagged output. 
i ε   = Tax revenue elasticity of the i’th tax base 
E ε   = Government expenditure elasticity at time t 
i   = personal income tax revenue, indirect tax revenue and social security contributions,  
γ   = the proportion of corporate taxes paid in the year in which the tax is levied,  
c ε    = Corporate tax revenue elasticity 
R
Ri    are calculated as averages over the years1980 to 1992 
t R   = Government revenue at time t. 
t s R ,   = Structural government revenue at time t. 
t E   = Government expenditure at time t.  -  21  - 
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t s E ,   = Structural government expenditure at time t. 
t
p Y   = Potential output at time t 
t Y   = Actual output at time t 
F   = Okun’s coefficient derived (by regression analysis) from 
t t t s p
t
p
t t e U U
Y
Y Y
+ − ⋅ + =
−
) ( , σ α  
t s U ,    = structural (or trend) unemployment.  
υ    = increase in unemployment insurance benefits due to a one unit increase in 
unemployment, derived (by regressions analysis) from 
t t t t t e U U UIB UIB + − ⋅ + = − − − ) ( 1 1 υ α  
t UIB   = total unemployment insurance benefits at time t 
NCA   = Net capital outlays 
GI   = Gross interest payments 
CSV   = Country specific variable 
t c T ,   = Corporate tax revenue 
t i T ,   = Tax revenue from the i’th tax base,  
  i = social security contributions, indirect taxes and personal income taxes 
0 R    = Government revenues in the base year where Y=Y
P 
0 E    = Government expenditure in the base year where Y=Y
P 
0 Y    = Output in the base year, deemed close to potential GDP  -  22  - 
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Tables 
Table A. Summary Statistics for the Six Budget Balance Indicators (1988-1999) 
   TBB  SBBIMF SBBOECD SBBEU FS 
Austria   Mean  -3.09  -3.03  -3.19  -3.09  0.16 
  Maximum  -1.86  -0.85  -1.08  -1.00  2.53 
    Minimum  -5.08 -5.30 -5.30 -5.32 -1.88 
    Std.  Dev.  1.12 1.37 1.38 1.33 1.40 
Australia   Mean  -1.31  -0.90  -1.98  -1.07  1.73 
    Maximum  1.20 0.60 1.59 0.61 3.14 
    Minimum  -4.65 -3.23 -4.97 -3.77 -0.43 
    Std.  Dev.  2.07 1.45 2.19 1.66 1.32 
Belgium   Mean  -5.03  -4.17  -3.95  -4.20  2.45 
    Maximum  -0.86 0.00 0.01 -0.21 6.29 
    Minimum  -7.94 -8.03 -7.81 -7.81 -1.15 
    Std.  Dev.  2.62 3.18 3.08 2.91 2.91 
Canada   Mean  -3.41  -1.76  -1.67  -1.88  2.50 
    Maximum  2.75 3.28 3.27 3.25 7.06 
  Minimum  -7.98  -4.50  -4.60  -4.65  0.19 
    Std.  Dev.  3.52 3.11 3.19 3.12 2.71 
Denmark    Mean  -0.72 -0.43 -0.54 -0.42 -0.94 
    Maximum  2.87 2.06 2.66 2.57 0.66 
    Minimum  -2.85 -1.83 -1.88 -1.89 -2.28 
    Std.  Dev.  1.84 1.16 1.41 1.41 0.94 
Germany    Mean  -2.26 -2.06 -2.17 -2.18 -1.94 
    Maximum  0.12 0.57 0.63 0.24 0.72 
    Minimum  -3.38 -4.40 -4.21 -4.08 -4.57 
    Std.  Dev.  1.01 1.57 1.58 1.40 1.65 
Finland    Mean  -0.68 0.34 -0.18 0.20 -1.48 
    Maximum  6.31 3.55 3.61 3.78 1.48 
    Minimum  -7.13 -2.02 -3.28 -2.73 -3.72 
    Std.  Dev.  4.66 1.98 2.19 2.32 1.57 
France    Mean  -3.05 -2.25 -2.80 -2.46 -0.67 
  Maximum  -0.50  -0.80  -0.89  -0.93  0.53 
    Minimum  -5.90 -3.79 -4.04 -4.09 -2.15 
    Std.  Dev.  1.95 1.12 1.15 1.18 0.96 
Greece   Mean  -9.66  -9.61  -9.55  -9.61  6.48 
  Maximum  -1.72  -2.08  -1.93  -2.08  13.99 
    Minimum  -16.12 -16.29 -16.54 -16.29  -0.26 
    Std.  Dev.  4.77 4.82 5.16 4.82 4.88 
Ireland   Mean  -1.27  -1.06  -1.02  -1.09  1.00 
    Maximum  3.18 1.87 1.18 2.10 3.02 
    Minimum  -4.24 -3.82 -4.29 -3.82 -1.35 
    Std.  Dev.  2.21 1.89 1.75 1.89 1.47 
Italy   Mean  -7.63  -7.24  -55.36  -7.28 3.52 
  Maximum  -1.90  -0.51  -45.60  -0.58  10.58 
    Minimum  -11.04 -11.81 -60.95 -11.81  -1.49 
    Std.  Dev.  3.31 3.96 5.44 3.93 4.19 
Japan    Mean  -1.28 -1.39 -1.63 -1.38 -3.79 
    Maximum  2.88 1.64 1.70 1.67 -0.68  -  23  - 
  23 
    Minimum  -7.12 -5.54 -5.46 -5.58 -8.22 
    Std.  Dev.  3.40 2.63 2.72 2.66 2.71 
Netherlands   Mean  -2.86  -2.64  -3.08  -2.64  1.91 
  Maximum  0.50  -0.09  -0.37  -0.09  4.13 
    Minimum  -4.91 -5.75 -6.74 -5.75 -1.33 
    Std.  Dev.  1.69 1.72 2.07 1.72 1.68 
New Zealand  Mean  0.11  0.00  -0.03  0.28  1.60 
    Maximum  3.30 4.01 3.07 3.63 4.79 
    Minimum  -4.42 -3.74 -5.25 -4.14 -2.32 
    Std.  Dev.  2.63 2.40 3.20 2.71 2.48 
Norway    Mean  2.58 2.73 2.77 2.75 0.95 
    Maximum  7.88 5.94 6.38 6.19 4.32 
    Minimum  -1.73 -0.21 -0.58 -0.46 -2.13 
    Std.  Dev.  2.97 1.96 2.29 2.09 2.02 
Portugal   Mean  -3.95  -4.06  -4.14  -4.08  2.84 
  Maximum  -1.99  -1.99  -1.85  -1.97  5.03 
    Minimum  -6.11 -7.46 -7.32 -7.31 -0.60 
    Std.  Dev.  1.58 1.78 1.87 1.72 1.80 
Spain    Mean  -4.11 -4.00 -4.34 -4.20 -0.95 
  Maximum  -1.12  -0.98  -1.00  -1.02  1.18 
    Minimum  -7.02 -6.57 -6.32 -6.09 -2.99 
    Std.  Dev.  1.80 1.78 1.80 1.62 1.13 
Sweden   Mean  -2.30  -1.36  -1.63  -1.42  2.96 
    Maximum  5.20 5.15 4.76 4.65 8.88 
  Minimum  -11.76  -7.26  -8.01  -7.85  -3.01 
    Std.  Dev.  5.94 4.18 4.65 4.40 4.06 
US   Mean  -3.17  -2.71  -2.29  -2.71  1.71 
    Maximum  0.52 0.41 0.94 0.46 4.77 
    Minimum  -6.02 -4.95 -4.81 -5.07 -0.33 
    Std.  Dev.  2.04 1.91 2.11 1.93 1.83 
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Table B. Summary statistics for the first difference of fiscal indicators measured as deficits, 
1988-1999 
   TBB  SBBIMF SBBOECD SBBEU FS 
Austria   Mean  -0.09 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 -0.21 
    Maximum  2.32 1.10 1.33 1.36 1.10 
    Minimum  -1.93 -2.55 -2.51 -2.54 -2.51 
    Std.  Dev.  1.14 1.23 1.21 1.23 1.24 
Australia    Mean  0.04 0.02 -0.19 0.03 0.04 
    Maximum  2.88 1.47 1.63 1.89 1.31 
    Minimum  -1.36 -1.13 -1.67 -1.19 -1.01 
    Std.  Dev.  1.36 0.88 1.14 1.03 0.84 
Belgium    Mean  -0.53 -0.53 -0.57 -0.51 -0.49 
    Maximum  0.88 1.92 1.14 1.65 1.84 
    Minimum  -2.27 -2.83 -2.60 -2.52 -2.76 
    Std.  Dev.  0.97 1.27 1.08 1.15 1.20 
Canada   Mean  -0.53 -0.70 -0.67 -0.67 -0.62 
    Maximum  2.61 0.29 0.38 0.41 0.16 
    Minimum  -2.57 -2.88 -2.87 -2.85 -2.73 
    Std.  Dev.  1.68 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.87 
Denmark    Mean  -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.14 -0.01 
    Maximum  1.40 1.17 1.23 1.24 1.11 
    Minimum  -1.99 -1.75 -1.93 -1.84 -1.65 
    Std.  Dev.  1.14 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.84 
Germany    Mean  -0.10 -0.21 -0.13 -0.20 -0.24 
    Maximum  2.17 3.07 3.13 2.95 3.20 
    Minimum  -2.26 -1.72 -1.85 -1.86 -1.74 
    Std.  Dev.  1.19 1.37 1.42 1.31 1.39 
Finland   Mean  0.10 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.19 
    Maximum  6.47 2.26 2.52 2.52 1.91 
    Minimum  -2.97 -2.16 -1.93 -2.14 -1.87 
    Std.  Dev.  2.99 1.43 1.50 1.53 1.19 
France    Mean  0.08 -0.04 -0.16 -0.04 -0.05 
    Maximum  2.60 1.86 1.24 1.99 1.83 
    Minimum  -1.36 -1.77 -1.82 -1.70 -1.69 
    Std.  Dev.  1.22 0.95 0.83 0.96 0.93 
Greece    Mean  -0.89 -0.84 -0.86 -0.84 -0.83 
    Maximum  2.88 3.58 3.74 3.58 4.10 
    Minimum  -4.59 -4.15 -4.16 -4.15 -3.84 
    Std.  Dev.  2.50 2.41 2.45 2.41 2.40 
Ireland    Mean  -0.67 -0.51 -0.37 -0.54 -0.40 
    Maximum  0.54 1.87 2.34 1.69 1.86 
    Minimum  -2.57 -1.77 -2.04 -1.88 -1.70 
    Std.  Dev.  1.07 1.28 1.50 1.20 1.18 
Italy    Mean  -0.80 -0.95 -0.99 -0.95 -1.01 
    Maximum  1.24 1.26 2.57 1.23 1.18 
    Minimum  -4.39 -4.61 -6.34 -4.59 -4.58 
    Std.  Dev.  1.39 1.41 2.42 1.41 1.41  -  25  - 
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Japan    Mean  0.78 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.62 
    Maximum  3.06 2.43 2.40 2.44 2.48 
    Minimum  -1.00 -0.99 -1.03 -1.01 -1.02 
    Std.  Dev.  1.33 1.19 1.05 1.19 1.18 
Netherlands    Mean  -0.45 -0.32 -0.38 -0.32 -0.23 
    Maximum  0.98 1.18 1.16 1.18 1.39 
    Minimum  -2.13 -2.45 -2.80 -2.45 -2.50 
    Std.  Dev.  1.03 1.25 1.40 1.25 1.37 
New Zealand   Mean  -0.19  -0.35  -0.64  -0.34  -0.39 
    Maximum  2.71 1.75 1.49 1.96 2.08 
    Minimum  -3.99 -3.64 -2.55 -3.70 -3.37 
    Std.  Dev.  1.77 1.58 1.39 1.61 1.45 
Norway   Mean  -0.18 -0.17 -0.19 -0.18 -0.19 
    Maximum  3.96 4.00 4.04 3.66 3.53 
    Minimum  -3.09 -2.41 -2.55 -2.54 -2.62 
    Std.  Dev.  2.26 2.10 2.16 2.04 1.97 
Portugal    Mean  -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.19 
    Maximum  3.16 3.34 3.29 3.27 3.26 
    Minimum  -3.07 -3.25 -3.35 -3.32 -3.57 
    Std.  Dev.  1.82 1.65 1.74 1.66 1.68 
Spain    Mean  -0.18 -0.25 -0.27 -0.25 -0.16 
    Maximum  2.75 1.56 1.28 1.34 1.60 
    Minimum  -2.07 -2.35 -2.00 -2.13 -1.84 
    Std.  Dev.  1.41 1.24 1.13 1.14 1.09 
Sweden   Mean  0.15 -0.40 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29 
    Maximum  6.41 3.08 4.17 4.04 2.94 
    Minimum  -4.26 -5.28 -5.21 -5.18 -4.90 
    Std.  Dev.  3.66 2.54 2.80 2.74 2.50 
US    Mean  -0.39 -0.41 -0.45 -0.41 -0.41 
    Maximum  1.01 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.74 
    Minimum  -1.32 -1.04 -1.10 -1.10 -0.95 
    Std.  Dev.  0.87 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.59 
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Table C. Parameter estimates of explanatory variables from the regression of real growth 







IV Lag  only 
1) Y    )TBB  -1.77* -1.88*  - 
R
2=0.256  )TBB-1 -0.04  -0.04 -0.14 
 i -1 -0.57*  -0.60*  -0.81* 
 OIL-1 -0.52  -0.72  -0.73 
3) Y    )SBBIMF  -0.00 1.32*  - 
R
2=0.120  )SBBIMF -1 0.12  -0.15  0.12 
 i -1 -0.77*  -0.85*  -0.77* 
 OIL-1 -0.72  0.14  -0.71 
4) Y    )SBBOECD  0.28*  0.38* - 
R
2=0.063  )SBBOECD -1  0.22  0.11 0.17 
 i -1  -0.62*  -0.64* -0.61* 
 OIL-1  -1.30*  -1.05* -1.28* 
5) Y    )SBBEU  -0.34* -0.74*  - 
R
2=0.143  )SBBEU -1 0.08  0.10  0.10 
 i -1 -0.82*  -0.83*  -0.86* 
 OIL-1 -0.60  -0.26  -0.58 
6) Y    FI  -0.05 1.53*  - 
R
2=0.122  FI –1 0.09  -0.13  0.10 
 i -1 -0.72*  -0.82*  -0.73* 
 OIL-1 -1.02*  -0.57  -1.00* 
*) Significant on a 5% significance level. R
2 are for the un-weighted residuals for the basic regressions  -  27  - 
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Table D. Sensitivity the regressions of real growth rates on fiscal and monetary and external 














1) Y    )TBB  -1.66* -1.56*  -1.68* 
  )TBB-1 -0.02  -0.19 -0.09 
 i -1 -0.90*  -0.63*  -0.46* 
 OIL-1 -1.35*  -0.20*  -0.64 
3) Y    )SBBIMF  -0.52* 0.00  0.15 
  )SBBIMF -1 -0.01  -0.07  0.27 
 i -1 -0.93*  -0.79*  -0.54* 
 OIL-1 -1.36*  0.28  -0.72 
4) Y    )SBBOECD  0.48* 0.38*  0.56* 
  )SBBOECD -1 0.45*  0.01  0.54* 
 i -1 -0.55*  -0.94*  -0.72* 
 OIL-1 -2.10*  -0.25  -0.87 
5) Y    )SBBEU  -0.32* -0.22  -0.23 
  )SBBEU -1 0.25*  0.01  0.20 
 i -1 -1.13*  -0.89*  -0.72* 
 OIL-1 -1.71*  -0.46  -0.53 
6) Y    FI  -0.48* -0.02  0.12 
 FI –1 0.05  -0.04  -0.18 
 i -1 -0.87*  -0.75*  -0.54* 
 OIL-1 -1.62*  -0.77  -0.97* 
a) Regression includes the effective exchange rate and export to GDP ratio. Both extra variables were significant in the 
regression for TBB, SBBIMF, SBBOECD and FI. The export to GDP ratio was significant in the regressions for SBBEU.  
b) 1992 for SBBIMF and FI. 
*) Significant on a 5% significance level. 
 





TBB  1.91 / 1.87 
SBBIMF  1.66 / 1.59 
SBBOECD  1.82 / 1.80 
SBBEU  1.79 / 1.82 
FI  1.68 / 1.62 
a) See Baltagi (1995) p. 94 for the test statistic and or Bhargava et al. (1982) for critical values specific to panel 
data. b) First number reported is for the basic regression. The second number is for the IV regression.  -  28  - 
  28 
 
Table F. Test for pooling of the basic individual country regressions 
 F-Statistic  P-Value  Qhi-Square  P-Value 
TBB  6.373423 0.000  484.3802  0.000 
SBBIMF  30.60960 0.000  2326.330  0.000 
SBBOECD  4.629172 0.000  333.3004  0.000 
SBBEU  5.495817 0.000  417.6821  0.000 
FI  36.12 0.000  2745.33  0.000 
 
Table G. Regression coefficients of fiscal variables from individual country basic 
regressions
a. 




SBBEU  SBBEU-1  FI FI-1 
Austria  -0.24  -0.51*  1.05* 0.68  0.48 1.07* 0.63  0.20 1.45* 0.67 
Australia  -5.75* 1.92*  -0.29 -3.12 -0.98  -3.59*  -2.07 -1.52 -0.47 -2.58 
Belgium  1.20  4.72*  0.2  1.2  0.67  0.47  0.62 1.39* 0.78  1.05 
Canada  -2.96*  0.37  -2.84* 1.87 -2.47* 1.32 -2.48*  1.84* -2.04  1.14 
Denmark  -4.40  2.46*  3.72 1.19 5.38 5.57  -1.88*  2.04*  5.39*  0.95 
Germany  0.45 3.64*  2.61* 4.11* 2.78* 3.25* 1.90* 3.49* 2.30* 2.86* 
Finland  -3.19* 1.13*  -3.01*  -3.81* 0.28  0.66 -2.26* -1.44 -3.39* -2.60 
France  -3.58*  -0.22  -1.73* -0.79  -0.36  0.07  -1.31  -0.14 -1.68* -0.86 
Greece  -1.94 2.52  -1.52*  0.56 1.57 -1.59 -0.05 0.98 -1.42 0.56 
Ireland  -0.76 -1.21  2.72* 0.78 2.64* -0.07 0.45  0.88 3.05* 0.33 
Italy  -1.61*  -0.88  1.29*  0.61  -1.26*  0.32 0.08 0.20  1.83*  0.71 
Japan  -3.59*  1.45*  -0.16 1.48 -0.52 0.75 -0.13 0.61 -0.33 1.46 
Netherlands -1.21*  -2.94*  0.47 -1.85* -0.32 -1.82* 0.76 -1.83*  1.10*  -1.15* 
New  Zealand  -4.60*  0.73  -1.89  -3.51*  -2.48 -1.98 -1.25 -1.39  -4.92*  -2.05* 
Norway  -1.40*  -2.12*  0.12 -1.36* 0.45 -3.08*  -2.04*  -2.96* 0.16 -1.32* 
Portugal  -1.10*  1.43*  0.79 1.48* 0.50  0.08  1.08 1.94* 1.10 1.79* 
Spain  -1.41*  0.12  1.17* 1.51* 1.59* 2.08*  0.71  1.43*  0.19  0.67 
Sweden  -0.54* 0.36  -0.74 0.78 1.01 0.13 -.052 0.16  -1.03*  0.56 
US  -5.65* 0.83  0.03 0.82 -1.81 0.44  -3.16*  0.67 -0.10 0.50 
a) Same unbalanced panel size used as in the panel data regressions of Table C and D. SUR estimation 
technique used.   -  29  - 
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